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Abstract
This paper discusses the approach of British and European Courts to the interpreta-
tion and application of the Article 5 ECHR right to liberty when faced with police 
powers. The paper argues that the long-standing approach of the European Court of 
Human Rights in Guzzardi v Italy [1980] ECHR 7367/76 is wrong and should be 
replaced with a new interpretation based on coercion. The paper goes on to argue 
that a new approach would allow the courts to effectively protect both Convention 
rights and the rule of law.
Keywords ECHR · HRA · Human rights · Legality · Rule of law · Right to liberty · 
Police powers
Introduction: The Problem
Legal black holes come in many shapes and forms. Some are created by the execu-
tive1 while others are fashioned by the legislature.2 Both are a danger to the rule of 
law. Legal black holes ‘create a zone in which officials can act unconstrained by the 
rule of law.’3 But they are not the most invidious threat to legality. Of greater danger 
are what Dyzenhaus calls grey holes: black holes lurking behind a façade of legality 
but in practice denying its substantive protections. Grey holes are especially invidi-
ous when their creation is assisted by the judiciary for ‘a little bit of legality can be 
more lethal to the rule of law than none.’4 But when we examine the approach of the 
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1 Exeter Law School, University of Exeter, Exeter, UK
1 See for example Steyn (2004); R (Abbassi) v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [2002] EWCA Civ 
1598; R v Secretary of State ex parte Hosenball [1977] 1 WLR 766.
2 Privative clauses, for example: R (Privacy International) v Investigatory Powers Tribunal [2019] 
UKSC 22, [2019] 2 WLR 1219.
3 Dyzenhaus (2006, p 202).
4 Ibid, p 50. Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 506.
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British judiciary to grey holes we find a troubling paradox. When faced with grey 
holes in cause célèbres5 the courts have been commendably robust. But when pre-
sented with cases involving prosaic police powers the courts have been a model of 
self-denying ordinance. In several cases involving the Convention right to liberty the 
judiciary has failed to close grey holes by ensuring that they are properly governed 
by the rule of law. And in one remarkable case, Austin,6 the judiciary themselves 
have created a serious grey hole in the protection of liberty.
The right to liberty and security is enshrined in Article 5 of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights.7 Article 5, the European Court of Human Rights8 frequently 
reminds us, is intended to protect individuals from arbitrary9 or unjustified10 interfer-
ences with their right to physical liberty11 and security.12 The framers of the ECHR 
had in mind the classical deprivations of liberty such as arrest or the detention of a 
gaoler, and the text of Article 5 certainly reflects this.13 Indeed, many of those involved 
in drafting the Convention had first-hand experience of police states, and this loomed 
large in their thinking.14 But since 1950 the nature of policing has changed consider-
ably and with it the powers granted by the state to police officers. As Murray details, 
stop and search powers barely existed in 1950.15 Yet today stop and search powers are 
a ubiquitous, if somewhat controversial, part of modern policing. The historic approach 
to policing, based on securing prima facie evidence of criminality before acting, has 
been displaced by a preventative approach based largely on suspicion or risk. Equally, 
significant are the legislative responses to terrorism which, in short, have significantly 
augmented police powers.16 These when combined with a paramilitary style of polic-
ing public order disturbances have moved policing away from its traditional Peelite 
roots.17Today, in addition to arrest, the citizen can be subject to a wide range of mod-
ern police powers that have clear implications for liberty. These powers come in many 
forms. For instance, notwithstanding powers enacted to deal with terrorism, police 
officers enjoy powers to stop and search powers,18 the power to conduct road traffic 
7 Herein ECHR. Article 5(1) provides: ‘Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one 
shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed 
by law…’ The article then lists six grounds on which the right to liberty may be limited by the state. 
Herein referred to as Article 5.
8 Herein referred to as the European Court.
9 Askoy v Turkey [1996] ECHR 21987/93, [76].
10 McKay v United Kingdom [2006] ECHR 543/03, [30].
11 Engel v The Netherlands [1976] ECHR 5100/71, [58]. Herein Engel.
12 Nikolaishili v Georgia [2009] ECHR 37048/04, [53].
13 Council of Europe (1956).
14 Ibid, pp 4–5.
15 Murray (2018, pp 600–602).
16 See for example Donohue (2007) and Walker (2011).
17 Waddington (1987, p 45), noting the threat that paramilitary style policing poses to liberty.
18 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s 1.
5 A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 AC 68.
6 Austin v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2009] UKHL 5, [2009] 1 AC 564. Herein Austin 
HL.
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stops,19 the power to stop and check travel documents,20 and the common law power to 
control crowds.
Yet, as will be shown below, the impact of Article 5 on such powers has been sur-
prisingly limited. In several cases dealing with police powers the courts have decided 
that Article 5 simply does not apply. The leading cases will be examined below. This 
development has created a legal grey hole, allowing the police to detain and control 
individuals with little judicial oversight before there is sufficient suspicion to arrest 
them.21 Untroubled by the possibility of Convention scrutiny the police enjoy open-
ended, low visibility, permissive discretionary powers22 that are at times used in a dis-
criminatory manner.23 Yet we are frequently told that the Convention is a living instru-
ment ‘which must be interpreted in light of present day conditions.’24 This paper argues 
that the current approach of the courts to the interpretation of Article 5 fails to take 
account of ‘present day conditions’ in this important context, and needs as a conse-
quence to be reconsidered. The problem is illustrated by the case of Roberts, discussed 
immediately below.25 The paper goes on to argue that in situations beyond the para-
digm deprivations of liberty, namely custody and arrest, a new test for the deprivation 
of liberty under Article 5 needs to be adopted. The seeds for change are already present 
in the European Court’s case law. As we shall see these seeds, when combined with les-
sons from Canadian law, offer a better approach to the interpretation of Article 5.
The Problem Illustrated: R (Roberts) v Commissioner of Police 
of the Metropolis
An excellent illustration of the current approach to the interpretation of Article 5 
by domestic courts can be seen in the case of Roberts.26 In Roberts the applicant 
had been travelling on a municipal bus when a ticket inspector discovered that she 
had insufficient funds to cover the cost of her bus journey. An argument developed 
between the inspector and the applicant, during which she provided false details to 
the inspector. The police were called when applicant became agitated and was asked 
to leave the bus in Haringey. At that time, the London Borough of Haringey was 
blighted by inter-gang rivalry and fighting. Consequently, a police inspector sta-
tioned in Haringey had authorised the use of power to stop and search for weapons 
under section 60 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (CJPO). Section 60 
CJPO allows a police officer to stop and search, without reasonable suspicion, 
19 Road Traffic Act 1998, s 6 and ss 163–164.
20 Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, s 147 and Schedule 8.
21 Murdoch (1993, pp 494–522, p 497).
22 Goldstein (1959–1960).
23 Equality and Human Rights Commission (2012).
24 Tyrer v UK [1978] ECHR 5856/72, [31].
25 R (Roberts) v The Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police [2012] EWHC 1977 (Admin), [2012] 
HRLR 746. Herein Roberts HC.
26 Ibid.
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anyone for offensive weapons or dangerous instruments when authorized to do so.27 
It is an offence not to stop.28 One of the attending police officers decided to search 
the applicant using the section 60 CJPO power. The applicant refused to be searched, 
kept firm hold of her bag and attempted to walk away. At this point the police officer 
told the applicant she was to be detained and, when she resisted once more, with the 
assistance of other police officers the applicant was handcuffed and pinned to the 
ground. The applicant’s bag was then searched, and on discovering bank cards in her 
maiden name and her son’s name she was arrested on suspicion of handling stolen 
goods and taken to Tottenham Police Station. But once the applicant’s identity had 
been established at the police station, she was released without charge. The appli-
cant subsequently brought judicial review proceedings alleging breaches of Articles 
5, 8 and 14 of the ECHR. At first instance Moses LJ held that there had been no 
deprivation of liberty during this process. Article 5 was not engaged. Moreover, had 
the claimant not resisted the stop and search would have had lasted only a few min-
utes. In reaching this decision Moses LJ referred not only to the House of Lords 
decision in Gillan29 but also to the more recent judgment of the European Court of 
Human Rights in Austin.30 According to Moses LJ the European Court in Austin had 
sensibly concluded ‘that the police must be afforded a degree of discretion in taking 
operational decisions and that Article 5 should not be interpreted in such a way as 
to make it impracticable for the police to fulfill their duties of maintaining order and 
protecting the public.’31 The applicant appealed. Before the Court of Appeal Arti-
cle 5 received only cursory treatment with Maurice Kay LJ concluding that he was 
‘entirely satisfied that [Article 5] has no application in the present case.’32 There was 
no appeal to the Supreme Court on the question of whether Article 5 was engaged.33 
In many ways Roberts is an unremarkable case. Stop and search powers are rou-
tinely and extensively used by the police.34 In this sense Mrs Roberts’ experience 
was typical. But what is remarkable is the tepid response of English courts when 
interpreting Article 5. By failing to recognise that the right to liberty and security 
can apply in such contexts the courts are effectively insulating the initial stages of 
27 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s 60(1) empowers a police inspector to authorize the 
use of s 60 for a period of twenty-four hours (extendable for another twenty-four hours) where he/she 
believes that it is either expedient to prevent incidents of serious violence or there may be people car-
rying dangerous instruments or offensive weapons in any locality in his/her police area without good 
reason.
28 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s 60(8).
29 R (Gillan) v The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2006] UKHL 12, [2006] 2 AC 307. 
Herein Gillan HL; Gillan v United Kingdom [2010] ECHR 4158/05, [2010] 50 EHRR 45. Herein Gillan 
ECHR.
30 Austin v United Kingdom [2012] ECHR 39692/09, (2012) 55 EHRR 14. Herein Austin ECHR.
31 Roberts HC (n 25 above), [14] quoting in part the judgment of the ECHR in Austin ECHR (ibid), [56].
32 R (Roberts) v The Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police [2014] EWCA Civ 69, [2014] 1 WLR 
3299, [11]–[13].
33 R (Roberts) v The Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police [2015] UKSC 79, [2016] 1 WLR 210, 
[14] Baroness Hale DPSC. Herein Roberts SC; Lennon (2016, pp 189–191).
34 Whilst the number of stops has declined over the last ten years, a significant number are still hap-
pening. In 2008/09 1.5 million stops and searches were carried out. By 2018/19 383,629 searches were 
undertaken, resulting in 58,876 arrests (an arrest rate of 15%). (Home Office 2019).
1 3
Police Powers and Article 5 ECHR: Time for a New Approach to the…
contact between citizens and the police from judicial scrutiny and thus the rule of 
law.35 Whilst an arrest must naturally be considered a serious intrusion on personal 
liberty and security, the law should not be indifferent to interferences short of that. 
Road traffic stops, stops and searches by foot patrols and crowd control measures all 
interfere with the right to liberty and security.
The Source of the Problem: Guzzardi v Italy
The tepid response of English courts to Article 5 claims is on one level understand-
able given the European Court’s long-standing approach to the interpretation of this 
article is itself flawed. At the root of the problem is the test that the European Court 
has developed for determining whether there has been a deprivation of liberty within 
the terms of Article 5. The leading authority under Article 5 is Guzzardi v Italy.36 In 
Guzzardi the applicant, a suspected Mafioso, was placed under special supervision 
by the Italian courts. The special supervision involved an obligation to reside in a 
2.5 km squared corner of an island, Asihara, just off Sardina. The order included a 
range of measures such as being under a curfew and restrictions on social interaction 
with the local population. The question before the European Court was whether this 
supervision regime constituted a deprivation of liberty within Article 5(1) ECHR. 
The European Court concluded that residence requirement did constitute a depriva-
tion of liberty, with the circumstances resembling in many ways an open prison.37 
In reaching that conclusion the European Court made a number of seminal observa-
tions. The European Court observed that the guarantee contained in Article 5(1) is 
concerned with ‘the physical liberty of the person; its aim is to ensure that no one 
should be dispossessed of this liberty in an arbitrary fashion … the paragraph is not 
concerned with mere restrictions on liberty of movement … in order to determine 
whether someone has been "deprived of his liberty" within the meaning of Article 
5 the starting point must be his concrete situation and account must be taken of a 
whole range of criteria such as the type, duration, effects and manner of implemen-
tation of the measure in question.’38 The Court then continued observing that ‘the 
difference between deprivation of and restriction upon liberty is nonetheless merely 
one of degree or intensity, and not one of nature or substance … although the pro-
cess of classification into one or other of these categories sometimes proves to be 
no easy task in that some borderline cases are a matter of pure opinion, the Court 
cannot avoid making the selection upon which the applicability or inapplicability of 
Article 5 depends.’39
36 [1980] ECHR 7367/76. Herein Guzzardi.
37 Ibid [95].
38 Ibid [92].
39 Ibid [93]. Emphasis added.
35 Here American law under the Fourth Amendment is much more realistic in its approach. See Terry v. 
Ohio 392 US 1, 10–17 (1968) Warren CJ.
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There are number of difficulties with the Guzzardi test. To begin with the divid-
ing line between deprivations of liberty and restrictions on liberty is by no means 
evident.40 Furthermore, the provides ‘neither bright-line rule nor anything that 
begins to approximate to a clear definition.’41 Any underlying principle of approach 
‘is difficult to extract from the decisions and judgments.’42 Although the Guzzardi 
test depends on a number of objective criteria it also makes explicit provision for 
a large element of subjective judgment. This may have attractions from the judicial 
perspective, granting a broad discretion to determine cases. However, from the per-
spective of legal certainty—one of the key principles of Article 5—this is decidedly 
unsatisfactory. Indeed, deciding when a deprivation has occurred is a classic exam-
ple of Sorites’ paradox. When and where does a detention cease to be a restriction 
and become a deprivation? There is no clear answer, and no governing principles to 
be found in the jurisprudence. Consequently, the boundary between restriction and 
deprivation has been rightly described as erratic.43 Thus, for example, in Austin the 
European Court struggled to determine when a restriction on freedom of movement 
turned into a deprivation of liberty.44 It was precisely this problem that exercised 
Lord Hoffmann in JJ,45 and led him to conclude that Article 5 ought to be inter-
preted domestically as applying only to classical or paradigm restrictions on physi-
cal liberty such as confinement: ‘in order to preserve the key distinction between 
the unqualified right to liberty and the qualified rights of freedom of movement, 
communication, association and so forth, it is essential not to give an over-expan-
sive interpretation to the concept of deprivation of liberty.’46 Yet while that might 
provide a clean solution to the interpretative difficulties of Article 5 it restricts the 
application of an important guarantee to situations that hardly comports with either 
the text of the Article or indeed the injunction to read constitutional guarantees in a 
generous and purposive manner.47 Furthermore, Article 5 is shot through with the 
concept of legality. Limiting its initial application crucially prevents from the outset 
any effective attempt to properly regulate coercive powers in an increasingly impor-
tant area. For while modern police powers have developed apace since 1950, neither 
the text of Article 5 nor indeed the Guzzardi test have been reformulated to match.48 
Finally, the difficulties in this area are not helped by the inconsistent approach of the 
European Court to Article 5. Doubtless because of the inherent difficulties of the 
Guzzardi test the European Court has at times shied away from articulating a more 
robust and coherent interpretation in appropriate cases. For example, in Stefanov v 
Bulgaria49 the applicant had attended a police station for five hours so that he could 
40 Van Dijk (2006, p 459).
41 Chaskalson, (2006, chapter 40 [33]).
42 Murdoch (1993, p 497).
43 Ibid, p 499.
44 Austin ECHR (n 30), [67].
45 Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ [2007] UKHL 45, [2008] 1 AC 385.
46 Ibid [44].
47 Discussed more fully below.
48 Schabas (2015, p 220).
49 [2008] ECHR 65755/01.
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be interviewed as a witness to a criminal investigation. The applicant was kept wait-
ing and told that he was not free to leave.50 Before the European Court the applicant 
contended, amongst other things, that his detention was an unjustified interference 
with his Article 5 right. In determining that it was not, the European Court unhelp-
fully assumed, without demonstrating, that the applicant’s liberty interests protected 
by Article 5(1) had been infringed. Remarkably, the court cited many of the earlier 
contradictory decisions of the Commission and concluded that ‘the Court does not 
need to resolve [this contradiction] in the present case, as even assuming that the 
applicant was deprived of his liberty, and that Article 5 was thus applicable, it is sat-
isfied that this deprivation of liberty was justified under paragraph 1(b) of this provi-
sion.’51 This is unfortunate because such cases offer the Court a means of clarifying 
an area of the law badly in need of it.
The Domestic Interpretation of Article 5
The problem is thus not one that domestic courts are solely responsible for. But 
they have hardly improved matters. Domestically, as Roberts revealed, the Guzzardi 
interpretation has been supplemented by a de minimis principle. Domestic courts 
have restricted the application of Article 5 by holding that the deprivation is trivial 
and thus falls outside the scope of the guarantee. Thus, in Gillan the use of stop 
and search powers under the Terrorism Act was held to fall outside the scope of 
Article 5.52 According to Lord Bingham when subject to a stop and search a person 
was simply ‘kept from proceeding or kept waiting.’53 Whereas in Austin the use of 
such powers was transitory.54 Similarly, in Roberts Moses LJ stressed that had the 
applicant been cooperative then she would have only been delayed for a matter of 
a few minutes. Article 5 should not apply to such transitory restrictions on liberty. 
Thus, the problem of how short-term detention should be regulated by Article 5 has 
been solved by classifying it as largely inconsequential, unless physical restraint is 
employed. But this conclusion was unreasoned. In fact, in many of these cases the 
judges appear to be reasoning intuitively about the experiences of those subject to 
police powers.55 But crucially these experiences are not uniform, and for the mem-
bers of some communities far from pleasant.56
Another excellent illustration of the de minimis approach to Article 5 can be 
found in Beghal v DPP.57 In Beghal the Supreme Court was asked to consider, 
52 Terrorism Act 2000, ss 44–45.
53 Gillan HL (n 29), [25].
54 Austin HL (n 6), [17] Lord Hope.
55 Judgements under the American Fourth amendment dealing with police stops display the same rea-
soning. See Nadler (2002, pp 163–166).
56 Discussed further below.
57 [2015] UKSC 49, [2016] AC 88. Herein Beghal SC; For an excellent discussion of the decision in 
Beghal and Roberts see Ip (2017).
50 Ibid [71].
51 Ibid [71].
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amongst other things, the compatibility with Article 5 of powers contained in sec-
tion 53(1) and Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000. In the earlier case of R v Gul58 
the Supreme Court had noted with concern the implications for liberty of the broad 
statutory definition of terrorism Parliament had adopted in the Terrorism Act59 
when combined with the wide and intrusive powers which peppered the Act. Lords 
Neuberger and Judge noted, all be it obiter, that the form of detention contemplated 
by Schedule 7 presented ‘the possibility of serious invasions of personal liberty.’60 
Beghal was returning from a visit to Paris, where her husband had been detained in 
connection with suspected terrorist offenses, when she was stopped and questioned 
under Schedule 7. The powers contained in Schedule 7 granted nominated offic-
ers at ports and borders a suspicion-less power to stop, question and detain anyone 
who appears to be connected terrorist offences for up to six hours. During any such 
detention officers were free to access, search, seize, copy and retain all the informa-
tion on the detainee’s personal electronic devices such as mobile phones, laptops and 
tablets. Officers could also during a Schedule 7 detention take and retain DNA sam-
ples and fingerprints without consent. Naturally, the Schedule also imposed criminal 
liability for anyone stopped to willfully fail to comply with the obligations imposed 
by Schedule 7.61 In Beghal the appellant was not formally arrested62 but she was 
detained at the airport for an hour and three quarters while she was interrogated. 
Beghal contended that this use of Schedule 7 powers was incompatible with Article 
5. The Divisional Court concluded that although Article 5 was engaged, the inter-
ference was justified.63 Beghal unsuccessfully appealed to the Supreme Court. In 
dismissing Beghal’s appeal the Supreme Court made a number of important obser-
vations for the application of Article 5.
In the Supreme Court Lord Hughes concluded that Article 5 was only ‘barely’ 
engaged. In fact, his Lordship was unconvinced that Article 5 was engaged, and only 
proceeded on that basis because the Crown had conceded the point below.64 Indeed, 
had the Crown not accepted the contention that Article 5 applied, it is unlikely the 
Supreme Court would have examined the application of this Article at all. To put it 
another way, it is not clear when Article 5 should become engaged as Lord Hughes 
admitted: ‘The appellant was prevented from moving on from the airport for about 
an hour and three quarters … whether that period was sufficient to constitute a dep-
rivation of liberty for the purposes of article 5 is a question to which the answer is 
not clear.’65 His Lordship then went on to observe that in general preventing a per-
son being questioned leaving during the interrogation would only represent a restric-
tion on movement rather than a deprivation of liberty. However, this is unrealistic. 
For example, an individual detained under Schedule 7 is in a different to position 
58 [2013] UKSC 64, [2014] AC 126. Herein Gul. 
59 Terrorism Act 2000, s 1.
60 Gul (n 58), [63]–[64].
61 Terrorism Act 2000, schedule 7 paragraph 18.
62 Begal SC (n 57), [12].
63 [2014] QB 607.
64 Beghal SC (n 57), [53].
65 Ibid, [53].
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to an individual subject to an exclusion order under section 35 of the Anti-Social 
Behavior, Crime and Policing Act 2014. Where a police officer issues an exclusion 
order the individual subject to the order may not enter a specified geographical area, 
but they are free to move elsewhere.66 This, arguably, is a restriction on the common 
law right to freedom of movement.67 Whereas an individual subject to the provisions 
of Schedule 7 cannot move off at all. In fact it is an offence to do so. Be that as it 
may, Lord Hughes then went on to conclude that if, in practice, there was a depriva-
tion of liberty that this would be justified.68 However, once it was accepted that Arti-
cle 5 was applicable the majority concluded that any interference was justified as 
being necessary for the completion of the process.69 In this conclusion the Supreme 
Court found support in the decision of the European Court in Gahramanov where 
the court concluded that ordinary border checks would not engage Article 5 if they 
do ‘not exceed the time strictly necessary to comply with relevant formalities.’70 
With respect to ordinary border checks this must be right. But crucially Gahra-
manov was not concerned with interrogation and detention under counter-terrorism 
legislation at a border crossing.71 But there is a more fundamental problem with the 
majority’s reasoning. Unhelpfully the majority simply concluded that the limitation 
was justified. There was no demonstration of the limitation’s necessity. Perhaps it is 
inevitable that where a court concludes that a right ‘barely applies’ any subsequently 
limitation analysis will be less rigorous, and any interference will be more readily 
upheld. But this is not what the Convention demands. Once it is accepted that a right 
has been limited the onus of demonstrating that the interference is necessary falls 
to the Crown. The justification for the impugned limit must be demonstrably made 
out, after all these are fundamental Convention rights and freedoms. And crucially 
the limitations analysis is ‘an unavoidably normative inquiry, requiring the courts 
to take into account both the nature of the infringed right and the specific values 
and principles upon which the state seeks to justify the infringement.’72 In dissent 
Lord Kerr took a different approach, undertaking a limitations analysis.73 Examin-
ing the power to stop, detain, search and question Lord Kerr concluded that there 
was no evidence that a suspicion-less power was necessary. Indeed, no justification 
had been provided to that end. In fact, with respect to powers of detention it was 
66 Anti-Social Behavior, Crime and Policing Act 2014, s 35(1) provides: ‘a constable in uniform may 
direct a person who is in a public place in the locality specified in the authorisation—
 to leave the locality (or part of the locality), and
 not to return to the locality (or part of the locality) for the period specified in the direction (“the exclu-
sion period”).’
67 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte McQuillan [1995] 4 All ER 400, 421–422 
Sedley J.
68 Beghal SC (n 57), [54]. Unfortunately, this conclusion was asserted rather than demonstrated.
69 Ibid [56].
70 Gahramanov v Azerbaijan [2013] ECHR 26291/06, [41].
71 As Lord Steyn once observed ‘in law context is everything.’ R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2001] UKHL 26, [2001] 2 AC 532, [28].
72 RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada (Attorney General) [1995] 3 SCR 199, [62] La Forest J.
73 Beghal SC (n 57), [119]–[128].
 R. A. Edwards 
1 3
clear that the measure went beyond what was necessary.74A subsequent successful 
application to the European Court was considered, like Gillan before, under Article 
8 ECHR without the court touching upon issues around the application of Article 5. 
While this accords with the European Court’s long-standing practice it nonetheless 
has the unfortunate effect of diverting attention away from the interpretation of a 
right that is arguably much more significant in the context of police powers.
These restricted approaches to the interpretation of Article 5 have been further 
eviscerated by the questionable judgments of both the House of Lords and the Euro-
pean Court in Austin. Austin began with an application for judicial review brought 
by four people detained by the police in Oxford Street, London during the 2001 May 
Day demonstrations. Three of the four applicants had no connection with the dem-
onstrations and simply had the misfortune to be in the street when the police cor-
doned it off. However, all the applicants were told that they were not free to leave 
and would be arrested if they attempted to do so. The applicants spent the next six 
to seven hours detained, or ‘kettled’ as it has become known, in the street await-
ing their release. The applicants were unable to leave for any reason. Yet remark-
ably both the House of Lords and the European Court held that this detention did 
not involve a deprivation of liberty within the terms of Article 5. In essence, the 
House of Lords concluded that crowd control measures would not infringe the Arti-
cle 5 rights of individual members of the crowd.75 In the House of Lords Lord Hope 
gave the leading opinion. In contrast to the previous interpretative approach to Arti-
cle 5 where the purpose of the deprivation was considered in the context of decid-
ing whether it was justified,76 Lord Hope concluded that purpose could be used in 
determining whether there was a deprivation of liberty.77 Similarly, Lord Neuberger 
concluded that as this was not a paradigm case of detention, the intention of the 
police was clearly important in determining whether Article 5 applied.78 This con-
clusion is now open to question, for as the Grand Chamber noted shortly before it 
confirmed the decision of the House of Lords in Austin, ‘the purpose of measures 
by the authorities depriving applicants of their liberty no longer appears decisive for 
the Court’s assessment of whether there has in fact been a deprivation of liberty.’79 
Furthermore, Lord Hope continued, although there was no indication in either the 
text of Article 5 or the jurisprudence, there were nonetheless ‘sufficient indications 
elsewhere in the court’s case law that the question of balance is inherent in the con-
cepts that are enshrined in the Convention and that they have a part to play when 
consideration is being given to the scope of the first rank of fundamental rights.’80 
This, as some of the early jurisprudence of both the Commission and the European 
74 Beghal SC (n 57), [125].
75 Austin HL (n 6), [34].
76 See, for example, Osypenko v Ukraine [2010] ECHR 4634/04, [51]–[65].
77 Austin HL (n 6), [28].
78 Ibid [63].
79 Creanga v Romania [2012] ECHR 29,226/03, (2013) 56 EHRR 11, [93]. Herein Creanga. Creanga 
was not cited in Austin. We now find ourselves in the unfortunate position of having two Grand Chamber 
judgments that are, in principle, inconsistent.
80 Austin HL (n 6), [29].
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Court held, indicated the presence of a balancing mechanism in Article 5. Moreo-
ver, such balancing could be seen with respect to other rights, where in the case of 
Article 3 ECHR it was a long-standing and essential feature of the jurisprudence.81 
Thus a ‘pragmatic interpretation’ allows a ‘fair-balance’ to be struck when deciding 
whether a deprivation of liberty has occurred under Article 5. In other words, in 
addition to the express limits on the right to liberty set forth in Article 5(1) the arti-
cle contains a further implied limitation that allows the authorities to further balance 
the right against unarticulated public interest considerations.
This development should not be surprising. From Dallison v Caffrey on, Eng-
lish courts have been keen to stress that the rights of the individual are to be bal-
anced against society’s interest in detecting and prosecuting crime.82 Indeed, by the 
nineteen-eighties the interests of society had become synonymous with those of the 
police, who were seen by the courts as acting on their behalf.83 Unsurprisingly, the 
consequentialist reasoning of the common law has been carried over to cases involv-
ing Convention rights. For instance, the idea of ‘a fair balance’ has become integral 
to the general test of proportionality84 in a way not found in other comparable juris-
dictions.85 In fact, as Ashworth correctly observes, English judges have given rein to 
a broader notion of ‘balancing’ than the jurisprudence of the ECHR requires.86 And 
there is perhaps no better example of this than the decision of the House of Lords in 
Austin,87 where a consequentialist justification was read into the Convention. How-
ever, the text of Article 5 stipulates exactly what consequentialist public policy con-
siderations are acceptable. Crucially, fundamental rights conferred ‘without express 
limitation should not be cut down by reading implicit restrictions into them, so as to 
bring them into line with the common law.’88 But in Austin the House of Lords did 
exactly that.
Subsequently, the European Court agreed with the House of Lords finding no 
deprivation of liberty. Article 5(1), the Court concluded, ‘must be interpreted in a 
manner which takes into account the specific context in which the techniques are 
deployed, as well as the responsibilities of the police to fulfill their duties of main-
taining order and protecting the public.’89 Crucially Austin has subtly altered the 
Guzzardi test for an additional criterion of context has now been added to the list 
81 Soering v United Kingdom [1989] ECHR 14038/88.
82 Dallison v Caffrey [1965] QB 348, 367; See also the opinion of Lord Diplock Holgate-Mohamed v 
Duke [1984] 1 AC 437, 445.
83 [1981] 1 QB 128, 134.
84 Bank Mellat v Her Majesty’s Treasury (No 2) [2013] UKSC 39, [2014] 1 AC 700. Lord Sumption 
[20]. Lord Reed [72]–[74] dissenting, but not on this point. Herein Bank Mellat.
85 See for example R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103; Kentridge (2001, pp 36–38).
86 Ashworth (2002, p 127).
87 Austin HL (n 6), [34]. Similar arguments can be found in the other judgments discussed herein. Rob-
erts SC (n 33), [41], Roberts HC (n 25), [45]; Beghal SC (n 57), [75] In the context of national security 
the Supreme Court was happy to take the self-denying ordinance even further; See also Austin ECHR (n 
30), [87].
88 S v Zuma (CCT5/94) 1995 (2) SA 642, [15], Kentridge AJ citing himself in Attorney-General v Moagi 
1982 (2) Botswana LR 124, 184.
89 Austin ECHR (n 30), [60].
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of characteristics for determining when there has been a deprivation of liberty: ‘the 
Court is of the view that the requirement to take account of the “type” and “manner 
of implementation” of the measure in question enables it to have regard to the spe-
cific context and circumstances surrounding types of restriction other than the para-
digm of confinement in a cell.’90 People may now be detained outside the scope of 
Article 5 by referring to the intention of the police officer, and not the effect on the 
right to liberty. This runs counter to the previous understanding of Article 5 where 
intention was only a material consideration during the examination of whether the 
established interference with the right to liberty could be justified. But in by adopt-
ing such an interpretation the European Court has created a serious structural flaw in 
the architecture of Article 5. Article 5 has long been considered as a strong, though 
qualified, right. Those qualifications are set forth in Article 5(1). The traditional 
approach to the interpretation of Article 5 has stressed that given the importance 
of that article in the Convention, the list of exceptions to that Article is an exhaus-
tive one.91 Indeed, so important is the right to liberty, that the list of restrictions 
contained in Article 5(1) are to be strictly interpreted in a manner consistent with 
the purpose of Article 5.92 In other words, liberty can only ever be deprived under 
one of the justifications listed in Article 5(1). These permissible limitations are, for 
instance, much narrower than those allowed under Articles 8–11 of the Conven-
tion.93 However, as a consequence of Austin this orthodox view of Article 5 is now 
open to question.
Furthermore, this implied limit has implications for police powers for, as the 
minority in the European Court in Austin argued, it creates a carte blanche for police 
activity that interferes with the right to liberty, granting in effect a broader range of 
public interest limitations than the express text of the Article 5 allows. Balancing 
the right to liberty with public interest factors when deciding if the right applies 
undermines the effectiveness of the right and confines the guarantee to a limited 
set of circumstances. At a stroke the courts have created the legal black hole that 
Murdoch warned of.94 Indeed, it was only a matter of time before the scope of the 
limitation was extended. In Hicks95 the Supreme Court relied on the authority of 
Austin96 to justify the use of preventative detention by the Metropolitan Police dur-
ing the 2011 Royal Wedding.97 Hicks, other republicans, and several ‘zombie’ pro-
testors had all been arrested on in order to prevent an imminent breach of the peace. 
The police argued the applicants intended to disrupt the Royal Wedding, and on that 
basis they were arrested and detained in custody until the wedding was over. Lord 
Toulson concluded that the arrest and detention were lawful under both the inherent 
90 Austin ECHR (n 30), [59].
91 Saadi v United Kingdom [2008] ECHR 13229/03, [43].
92 Vasilevia v Denmark [2003] ECHR 52792/99, [32]–[33]. Herein Vasilevia.
93 Ciulla v Italy [1989] ECHR 11152/84, [41].
94 Murdoch (1993, p 497).
95 R (Hicks) v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis [2017] UKSC 9, [2017] AC 256. Herein 
Hicks.
96 Austin HL (n 6), [34].
97 Hicks (n 95), [31] Lord Toulson.
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proportionality of Article 5 and Article 5(1)(c) itself.98 Once more the right to lib-
erty was balanced away in favour of public order.99
An Alternative Interpretation of Article 5?
In an important aspect of Convention interpretation and application the cur-
rent approach of the courts is open to criticism. This naturally begs the question 
is an alternative interpretation of Article 5 possible? In determining when Article 
5 applies the starting point must be to examine the aim and purpose of the guar-
antee, in other words the guarantee must be given a purposive interpretation. The 
purpose of a constitutional guarantee is to be understood in light of the interests that 
it is designed to protect. This analysis ‘is to be undertaken, and the purpose of the 
right or freedom in question is to be sought by reference to the character and larger 
objects of the charter itself, to the language chosen to articulate the specific right or 
freedom, to the historical origins of the concept enshrined, and where applicable, 
to the meaning and purpose of the other specific rights and freedoms with which 
it is associated within the text of the charter.’100 Moreover, it is axiomatic that as 
the HRA is both a legal guarantee of fundamental rights and a remedial statute, the 
guarantees must be read and interpreted in a generous manner, without implied lim-
its that illegitimately cut down the scope of the rights.101
The right to liberty is, as the European Court frequently notes, a right of funda-
mental importance to the freedom of the individual in a democratic society.102 The 
right to liberty is a strong safeguard against arbitrary or unjustified arrest and deten-
tion.103 Any deprivation of physical liberty must therefore be executed strictly in 
accordance with the law.104 The principle of legality demands that any deprivation 
of liberty not only conforms with the law but also that any deprivation of liberty 
should be in keeping with the primary purpose of Article 5, namely protecting the 
individual from arbitrariness.105 This requirement is amplified in the rule that all 
laws interfering with the right to liberty must be sufficiently accessible and precise. 
The European Court has previously held that such an interpretation is consistent 
with the aim and purpose of Article 5, namely preventing arbitrary deprivations of 
liberty.106 Thus care must be taken to ensure that the principle of legal certainty is 
98 Ibid [41] Lord Toulson.
99 Ibid [29]–[30] Lord Toulson; A subsequent application to the European Court was declared inadmis-
sible: Eiseman-Renyard v United Kingdom [2017] ECHR 57,884/17.
100 R v Big M Drug Mart [1985] 1 SCR 295, [117] Dickson J; See also Alexy (2002, pp 84–86, p 180 
and p 199).
101 Minister of Home Affairs (Bermuda) v Fisher [1980] AC 319, 328 Lord Wilberforce.
102 McKay (n 10), [122]; Lukanov v Bulgaria [1997] ECHR 21915/93, [41].
103 Engel (n 11), [58].
104 Cyprus v Turkey (1992) 15 EHRR 509, [119].
105 Amuur v France [1998] ECHR 17/1995, [50].
106 Winterwerp v The Netherlands [1979] ECHR 6301/73, (1980) 2 EHRR 387, [37].
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satisfied.107 The importance of preventing the abuse of this right is further reflected 
not only in the requirement that its exceptions are strictly and narrowly interpreted 
but also in the requirement that interfering powers be exercised in a proportionate 
manner.108 The right to liberty is, as the European Court noted, frequently interfered 
with in circumstances where legal protections are ineffective, and the rule of law can 
be easily subverted.109
All this, of course, reflects one of the principal considerations of the drafters of 
the ECHR which was, as the former Commission concluded in the East African 
Asians Case, the ‘protection [of the individual] against arbitrary arrest and deten-
tion.’110 Such concerns were once those of English law. Blackstone, for example, 
long ago observed that:
the law of England regards, asserts, and preserves the personal liberty of indi-
viduals. This personal liberty consists in the power of loco-motion, of chang-
ing situation, or removing one’s person to whatsoever place one’s own incli-
nation may direct ; without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course 
of law …. [The] confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him to gaol, 
where his sufferings are unknown or forgotten is a …. dangerous engine of 
arbitrary government. … [Moreover] the confinement of the person, in any 
way, is an imprisonment. So that the keeping a man against his will in a pri-
vate house, putting him in the stocks, arresting or forcibly detaining him in the 
street, is an imprisonment.111
Therefore, reading Article 5 as simply applying to classical deprivations of lib-
erty, such as imprisonment and arrest, would thus be to adopt a restrictive interpreta-
tion at odds with both the text and the intentions of the framers. Such an interpreta-
tion would confine Article 5 to situations where the individual was in jeopardy of 
imminent arrest, while leaving situations short of that unregulated save in cases of 
egregious abuse. In fact, there is nothing in the travaux préparatoires to indicate 
that Article 5 was intended to apply only to classical deprivations of liberty. Article 
5 must apply to situations that are not arrests because although an arrest includes 
detention, detention does not necessarily include an arrest. Detention thus includes 
an element of state compulsion, which might include but is not limited to arrest, but 
which nevertheless interferes with the physical liberty and security of the individual.
107 Khudoyorov v Russia [2005] 6802/02, [125].
108 Vasileva (n 92), [41].
109 McKay (n 10), [123].
110 [1973] ECHR 4403/70, (1981) 3 EHRR 76, [222].
111 Blackstone, (1765, 1:134–135). The right of locomotion is recognised to be part of the right to lib-
erty and security by the US Supreme Court: Shapiro v Thompson 394 US 618, 629 (1969).
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Deprivations of Liberty: A New Test Based on Coercion?
How then should Article 5 be read when considering the interactions between the 
citizen and police? The police have a duty to prevent and detect crime. In the pursuit 
of that duty they interact with the public. Strictly speaking there is no legal duty to 
cooperate with police requests where they are made without legal authority.112 The 
police may not detain a citizen ‘to help with enquiries.’113 Without statutory author-
ity the police may not detain someone for questioning.114 The basis of policing is 
consent.115 Indeed, the Philips Commission began its discussion of the necessity of 
coercive powers for the conduct of effective investigations from the starting point of 
consent. Both arrest and stop and search were paradigm examples of coercive pow-
ers that involved deprivations of liberty.116 Unsurprisingly, section  2(8) of PACE 
allows an officer to detain an individual for ‘such time as it is reasonably required 
to permit a search to be carried out.’117 Without the authority of section 2(8) PACE 
detentions for stops and searches would be unlawful.118 There is no common law 
power to stop and search.119 But whatever the theory of policing a citizen nor-
mally complies with requests from police officers, driven by a mixture of respect 
for authority, a desire to help, fear and ignorance as to the extent of police powers. 
Members of ethnic minorities may in fact feel less able to walk away from such 
requests or encounters. The over policing of racial minorities, long documented, has 
arguably created a situation where individuals who are exposed to frequent and for-
mal interactions with the police more readily comply with demands in order simply 
to escape.120 Often, such encounters are not just frequent but also unpleasant.121
However, with respect to the power of stop and search the situation is more for-
mal. While in theory a person who is stopped and asked to account could simply 
walk away a refusal to submit to a stop and search constitutes a criminal offence, as 
does wilfully obstructing such a search.122 Both offences are punishable by impris-
onment. Of course, it is most unlikely that the average citizen is aware of their exact 
legal position and is likely when faced with a demand from a police officer to com-
ply rather than risk assault or arrest for obstruction. As Robert Goff LJ observed, 
a police officer has the ‘advantage of authority.’123 An officer does not need to 
bark orders. Police officers are perceived as an authority with whom compliance is 
112 Rice v Connolly [1966] 2 QB 414, 419 Parker LCJ.
113 R v Lemsatef [1977] 2 All ER 835, 839 Lawton LJ; I I v Bulgaria [2005] ECHR 44,082/98, [87].
114 Kenlin v Gardner [1967] 2 QB 510, 519 Winn LJ.
115 Home Office (2012).
116 Phillips (1981, paras 3.2–3.3).
117 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s 2(8).
118 Roberts SC (n 27), [29].
119 Kenlin (n 114), 519.
120 R v Le 2019 SCC 34, [109] – [110] Brown J. Herein Le; Strauss (2001, pp 241–244).
121 Young (2017).
122 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s 60(8); Police Act 1996, s 89(2); PACE, s 117 and 
(Home Office, 2015, para 3(2)).
123 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172, 1176.
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required.124 Indeed, there is evidence that supports the idea that obedience to author-
ity is so ‘deeply ingrained, that people will obey authority even when it is not in 
their own best interest to do so, and that obedience increases when the authority 
figure has visible trappings of authority, such as a uniform.’125 Psychological com-
pulsion in such circumstances can make the restraint of liberty involuntary and thus 
amount to a deprivation. Indeed, in light of this can we say that when an individ-
ual is detained under a coercive power for a stop and search he/she is any longer at 
liberty?
Moreover, the nature of police encounters is, as the European Court has noted, 
coercive even when they are brief.126 For instance, although the European Court did 
not express a final view in Gillan, it nevertheless noted that ‘this element of coer-
cion is indicative of a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5(1).’127 
But since then the European Court has developed the concept of coercion with 
greater clarity, particularly in cases where Article 8 has no application. In Shimovo-
los v Russia the European Court reiterated its earlier views expressed in Gillan.128 
In Shimovolos the applicant was stopped by the police. After they had checked his 
identity papers they escorted him to the police station, under the threat of force if he 
refused. It was made clear to the applicant that he was not free to leave the station 
unless he was authorised to do so. At the police station the applicant was detained 
for forty-five minutes while he was briefly questioned and his details were checked 
against the police records. Only then was he allowed to leave. The court concluded 
that ‘there was an element of coercion which, notwithstanding the short duration 
of the arrest [sic], was indicative of a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of 
Article 5(1).’129
Similar reasoning can be seen in Foka v Turkey.130 In Foka it was argued by the 
respondent that the applicant had not been formally detained by the Turkish police 
at the border between the two halves of Cyprus. The applicant refused to allow a 
search of her bags and was placed by the officers in a police car and taken to the 
police station. At the police station her person and bag were search, some items 
were confiscated, she was fined and then released to continue her journey. The Turk-
ish government argued that Article 5(1) was not applicable because the applicant’s 
detention was merely transient and temporary.131 Foka argued that she had been for-
cibly restrained and compelled to go to the police station and confined there against 
her will.132 The European Court agreed: ‘As force was used in order to compel 
the applicant to get into the car, the Court considers that there was an element of 
124 Nadler (2002, p 189 and pp 201–202).
125 Strauss (2001, p 236) citing work by Stanley Milgram and Leonard Bickman.
126 Shimovolos v Russia [2011] ECHR 30,194/09, [49].
127 Ibid [57].
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid [50]. The ‘arrest’ was a de facto one. It fell outside the scope of any of the exceptions to Article 
5(1). See further [51]–[57].
130 Foka v Turkey [2008] ECHR 28940/95. Herein Foka.
131 Ibid [69].
132 Ibid [66].
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coercion, which affected not only the applicant’s freedom of movement, but also her 
liberty.’133
Equally, in Venskute v Lithuania134 the European Court examined an application 
where the individual’s will had been overborne by police action. Venskute was sus-
pected of defrauding an insurance company, and consequently a pre-trial investiga-
tion was instituted in accordance with Lithuanian law. Two police officers went to 
the applicant’s workplace, a restaurant, where they introduced themselves. Accord-
ing to the applicant the officers threatened to use force if she refused to accompany 
them. However, the police officers claimed that they merely invited the applicant 
to accompany them.135 Thus in determining whether the Article 5(1) guarantee 
had been engaged was the question of whether the applicant had gone to the Vil-
nius police HQ as a consequence of free will or because of mental coercion.136 The 
European Court held that the evidence pointed in the direction of the latter. Further-
more, it was unrealistic to assume that during the applicant’s detention in the police 
HQ she was free to leave during the five and a half hours before she was formally 
arrested. This detention in the police HQ constituted a de facto deprivation of the 
applicant’s liberty.137
Finally, since Shimovolos there have been a number of Russian applications that 
involved the Federal Code of Administrative Offences. These cases are interesting 
because like stop and search powers they involve a form of formal control that falls 
short of arrest in law. The Federal Code authorises ‘the competent authorities to 
compel a person to follow a competent officer.’138 The Code provides that a person 
can only be escorted to a police station for the purposes of drawing up a record of an 
alleged administrative offence if it is not practicable at the place where it occurred: 
if this not the case or cannot be subsequently demonstrated then any deprivation 
of liberty caused by a use of the power is unlawful.139 In many ways the powers 
contained in the Federal Code are analogous to those of stop and search. Both are 
intended to facilitate investigations. Similarly, neither is a formal power of arrest. 
And they are both exercised by police officers in a manner that leaves no scope for 
non-compliance. Indeed, non-compliance would undoubtedly lead to formal arrest. 
Thus, there is an element of control and coercion which, although it might be short 
lived, is intrusive in nature. In Tsvetkova v Russia140 the European Court examined a 
number of co-joined applications that all involved the use of administrative escorting 
under the Federal Code. The European Court concluded that the practice of admin-
istrative escorting amounted to a deprivation of liberty. In reaching this conclusion 
133 Ibid [78].
134 [2012] ECHR 10645/08.
135 Ibid [8]–[10].
136 Ibid [73].
137 Ibid [74].
138 Article 27(1)-(2). In addition, under Article 27(3) a person may be subject to a formal arrest. The 
powers are helpfully summarised in Butkevich v Russia [2018] ECHR 5865/07, [33]–[34].
139 Timishev v Russia [2017] ECHR 47598/08, [22]. Lashmankin v  Russia [2017] ECHR  57818/09, 
[489].
140 [2018] ECHR 54381/08.
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the court made no reference to Guzzardi. Instead, the court observed that none of the 
applicants enjoyed any free will when escorted: ‘Throughout the events there was an 
element of coercion which notwithstanding the relatively short duration of the pro-
cedure in certain cases was indicative of a deprivation of liberty with the meaning of 
Article 5(1).’141
Coercion can be present even where officers do not rely expressly upon the 
authority of the law. In Rozhkov v Russia (No.2)142 the applicant was visited in his 
office by the police. The applicant was informed that his name was on a list of sus-
pects and that he was to follow the officers, so he could be interviewed. The appli-
cant was not shown any authority for the request, and unsurprisingly refused: He 
was not, however, arrested. The officers merely informed the applicant that they 
would employ force if necessary. At a subsequent visit the applicant was treated in 
an identical manner. The European Court concluded that on both occasions that the 
applicant had been deprived of his liberty: ‘The Court considers that throughout 
events on that day there was an element of coercion which notwithstanding the short 
duration of the procedure was indicative of a deprivation of liberty within the terms 
of Article 5(1) ECHR.’143
The recognition of the effect that coercive police powers have on the individ-
ual has long been a central feature of the jurisprudence of the Canadian Supreme 
Court when interpreting section 9 of the Canadian Charter.144 Indeed, Canadian law 
crucially recognises that coercion can go beyond the physical and encompass the 
psychological. This case law has important lessons for the interpretation and appli-
cation of Article 5.145 Thus, in Therens the Canadian Supreme Court considered 
what constituted a deprivation of liberty for the purposes of section 9 and thus the 
point when the guarantees of   section 10 of the Charter would come into play.146 
In Therens the Supreme Court had to determine whether there had been a depri-
vation of liberty when a car driver was requested to undertake a breathalyser test 
by a police officer under the Criminal Code. If there had been a deprivation of lib-
erty the defendant would be entitled, it was argued, to the assistance of counsel as 
required by Sect. 10 of the Charter. In deciding that there had been a deprivation of 
liberty Le Dain J held that a detention occurred ‘when a police officer or other agent 
of the state assumes control over the movement of a person by a demand or direc-
tion which may have significant legal consequences and which prevents or impedes 
access to counsel. when a police officer or other agent of the state assumes control 
over the movement of a person by a demand or direction which may have significant 
141 Ibid [107]–[108].
142 Rozhkov v Russia (No.2) [2017] ECHR 38898/04.
143 Ibid [79].
144 s 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) provides: ‘Everyone has the right not to 
be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned.’
145 Canadian jurisprudence has frequently been cited with approval by the European Court. See, for 
example, the decision of the European Court in Allan v UK [2002] ECHR 48,539/99 where the court 
expressly refers to the guidance that Canadian jurisprudence provides in assisting with the interpretation 
of Article 6 ECHR: [30]–[32], [51].
146 Section 10 provides a number of rights, such as the right to counsel, to those arrested or detained.
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legal consequences.’147 The key question is, therefore, when faced with a demand 
or direction from an agent of the state, does a person reasonably regard himself as 
free to refuse?148 If the powers are backed by the possibility of criminal liability for 
a refusal to comply then there is in effect compulsion149: ‘any criminal liability for 
failure to comply with a demand or direction of a police office must be sufficient to 
make compliance involuntary.’150 Thus as police action is by its nature intimidating, 
and the citizen is uncertain as to the extent of police powers,151 compliance in such 
street encounters is not really voluntary.152
The concept of coercion was re-considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Grant.153 In Grant the appellant was stopped and asked to account for his presence 
in a Toronto suburb. Three officers were undertaking surveillance operations in 
the suburb as a consequence of a series of robberies. The officers’ suspicions were 
aroused by an intense stare that the appellant gave the officers while ‘fidgeting’ with 
his coat and trousers in a suspicious way. The Canadian Supreme Court was asked 
to re-consider what constituted the definition of ‘detention’ under sections 9–10 of 
the Charter. At the outset the majority recognised that the definition of ‘detention’ 
was imperative to the proper effectiveness of the guarantee. An overbroad defini-
tion, that is too generous, would result in every fleeting interference or delay falling 
within the scope of the guarantee, and would unquestionably impede effective polic-
ing. Whereas, read narrowly all but situations where the police take explicit con-
trol, via for example arrest, would fall outside the guarantee leaving citizens open 
to abusive policing.154 The latter interpretation was rejected in Therens whereas in 
the earlier case of Mann the Canadian Supreme Court had rejected an application 
of the guarantees where the interaction between the police and citizen involved ‘no 
significant physical or psychological restraint.’155 Thus there is no detention when 
the police stop a person for purposes of identification, or even informal question-
ing. A person might be delayed, but he/she is not detained. The text of section 9 of 
the Charter indicates that for a detention there should be a significant deprivation of 
liberty with legal consequences.156 Clearly this would not only be the case where 
an individual is subject to a physical deprivation of his/her liberty, but would also 
be true where he/she had psychologically been detained. An individual would be 
psychologically detained where he/she is not only ‘legally required to comply with a 
direction or demand, as in the case of a roadside breath sample … [but also] where 
147 R v Therens [1985] 1 SCR 613, [53] dissenting, but not on this point. Herein Therens.
148 Ibid [54].
149 Ibid [56].
150 Ibid [56].
151 This is especially true of s 60 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 which may be brought into 
force and even the most legally aware citizen would not know that the police enjoy this power because 
there is no publication requirement.
152 Dedman v R [1985] 2 SCR 2, [59] Le Dain J.
153 R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353. Herein Grant.
154 Ibid [24].
155 R v Mann [2004] 3 SCR 59, [19] Iacobucci J. Herein Mann.
156 Ibid [29].
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there is no legal obligation to comply with a restrictive or coercive demand, but a 
reasonable person in the subject’s position would feel so obligated.’157 At one end 
of the spectrum psychological detention will merge with arrest or imprisonment and 
‘a legal obligation to comply with a police demand or direction’ will constitute a 
detention.158 In these circumstances it is not realistic to argue that a person is free 
to comply, when a refusal will lead to arrest and potential prosecution. Neverthe-
less the Canadian Supreme Court in Grant went on to examine the various situa-
tions where a person interacts with the police but there is no restraint or constraint 
of choice that has legal consequences. Does the Charter apply? In the majority of 
cases the answer would be ‘no’. For instance, helping a police officer with door-to-
door enquiries will not ordinarily have legal consequences and thus attract Charter 
protection. Being asked to assist the police with general enquiries in the street, a 
moral and social duty, does not normally have legal consequences either. However, 
the Charter might apply if the enquiries escalated. In circumstances where neither 
physical restraint nor legal obligations are present the Canadian Supreme Court held 
that a contextual approach would be necessary in order to determine whether the 
person had been detained. A court would need to look at the circumstances that gave 
rise to the encounter, the nature and language of the officers, and the characteristics 
of the defendant. Crucially as part of that exercise a court would need to objectively 
examine the particular characteristics of the detainee. In Le159 the Supreme Court 
of Canada held that it would take judicial notice of the evidence of race relations 
in deciding such cases. In such cases it was, as Brown J noted, important that the 
court took ‘into consideration the larger, historic and social context of race relations 
between the police and the various racial groups and individuals in our society.’160 
The key question is how would a ‘reasonable person of a similar racial background 
perceive the interaction with the police.’161 As in the United Kingdom,162 Canadian 
racial minorities have a disproportionate degree of contact with law enforcement 
agencies.163 In Le the accused was young, Asian and small in stature. The police had 
unlawfully entered the backyard of a townhouse where Le was chatting with friends. 
The police had no suspicion that Le was involved in any criminal behavior and no 
authority to act in the manner than they did. A reasonable person sharing these char-
acteristics would in that context be ‘profoundly intimidated’ by the police and would 
thus be detained for the purposes of section 9 of the Charter.164
157 Ibid [30].
158 Ibid [34].
159 Le (n 120), [75].
160 This contrasted with racial profiling where the principal focus would be upon the motivation of the 
police, ibid [76].
161 Ibid, [75].
162 For example, see Willis (1983) or the Equality and Human Rights Commission (2012).
163 Le (n 120), [90]–[94] which details research undertaken in Canada.
164 This issue was barely considered in by the court in Roberts SC (n 33), [37].
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The Consequences of a New Interpretation Based on Coercion
In the context of police powers short of arrest the traditional test for deprivation out-
lined in Guzzardi has failed to make Article 5 ‘practical and effective’ but rendered 
it ‘theoretical or illusory.’165 However, the kernel of a more suitable approach exists. 
As was outlined above the European Court has periodically referred to the role of 
coercion in deciding whether there has been a deprivation of liberty. In the context 
of police powers the Guzzardi approach should be replaced by reasoning based on 
the concept of coercion. The nascent concept of coercion in European law should be 
further developed by drawing upon Canadian precedent.
A reliance coercion would have a number of advantages. First, coercion, both 
physical and psychological, reaches deprivations of liberty beyond the classic incar-
nation scenarios such as prison and arrest. As such, a coercion-based interpretation 
better represents the purpose behind the Article 5 guarantee. It covers the classic 
deprivations, arrest providing the par excellence example, but crucially captures 
the psychological control of individuals by the police that would on the Guzzardi 
approach fall outside Article 5. Of course there is a tension here between a restric-
tive reading that limits the scope of Article 5 to classic detentions that is when the 
police take explicit control over the individual and compel obedience, and an over-
broad interpretation where detention is read as encompassing even the most fleeting 
delay such as social interaction. However, the concept of coercion offers a useful 
middle way between the two extremes. Physical liberty protected by Article 5 is not 
the preserve of an automaton but of autonomous individuals in a free society. The 
liberty interests of the individual depend on psychological liberty. Where an individ-
ual is subject to coercive powers, such as stop and search powers under PACE, there 
is a legal obligation to comply. There is no choice. Just as those ‘kettled’ in Austin 
had no choice. The element of coercion removes the individual’s ability to exercise 
his/her physical liberty on pain of criminal penalty. Article 5(1) should surely then 
apply in these circumstances. The argument that the operation of coercive powers is 
trivial, for example a person is merely ‘kept waiting’ or that the experience of being 
stopped and searched was a short-lived one, misses the important context of how 
these powers are used. Police stops are inherently coercive, both legally and psycho-
logically.166 These powers represent a direct gateway to the criminal justice process 
for powers to stop and search individuals are intended, in part, to discover evidence 
of criminality. Moreover, setting a high threshold for the engagement of Article 5 
effectively removes from scrutiny areas of low-level discretionary powers that have 
historically been abused,167 and licences a power to do what Article 5 is intended to 
stop. Furthermore, abuses of police power ‘will rarely affect respectable members 
165 Artico v Italy [1980] ECHR 6694/74, [33].
166 All the more so for minority groups for whom they are particularly humiliating, frightening and 
degrading: Tanovich, (2002, p 163).
167 Sanders and Young (2008, p 289).
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of the middle classes,’ but will instead ‘focus upon the poor and on the marginal, 
minority groups.’168
How then would the new interpretative approach to Article 5 affect, for instance, 
the result of Austin and Roberts? The applicants in Austin were closely detained for 
several hours and prevented leaving by the imminent threat of arrest. The physical 
control of the applicants was clearly coercive both physically and psychologically. 
The question under Article 5 would become ‘can this deprivation be justified?’ In 
Austin the applicants should have succeeded for the very simple reason that Arti-
cle 5(1) does not contemplate a general public order exception. This questionable 
interpretation of an already carefully qualified Article has seriously weakened the 
protection of the guarantee and needs to be revisited by the European Court as a 
matter of urgency. Furthermore, because the claims are dismissed when determining 
whether there has been a deprivation of liberty important issues such as the legality 
and proportionality of the police action are never properly scrutinised. If modern 
public-order policing necessitates a limit on the right to liberty then it is open to the 
Contracting States to amend Article 5 through an additional protocol. Indeed, on one 
level the absence of a public order exception in Article 5 is puzzling given the fre-
quent references to public order elsewhere. However, an examination of the travaux 
préparatoires reveals that the final form and structure of Article 5 was primarily the 
responsibility of the United Kingdom.169 The original drafts of the Convention pro-
posed to guarantee the right to liberty and security in a manner unqualified by a 
long list of specific exceptions. But during the drafting process, at the instigation of 
the United Kingdom delegation, the draft was amended to include a list of permis-
sible limitations. The United Kingdom successfully argued that it was possible to 
define all the reasonably necessary limitations that states require.170 Ironically, this 
has proved not to be the case.
In any case, shortly before its judgment in Austin v United Kingdom the European 
Court handed down another judgment involving Article 5. In Creanga v Romania 
the European Court observed that the case law examining the purpose of a detention 
when deciding if there had been a deprivation of liberty had evolved since the era of 
the Commission and as such ‘the purpose of measures by the authorities depriving 
applicants of their liberty no longer appears decisive for the Court’s assessment of 
whether there has in fact been a deprivation of liberty.’171 This welcome clarification 
of the law was sadly short-lived. Indeed, Austin has proved more influential despite 
the attempt of the European Court to confine its decision to ‘the specific and excep-
tional facts of this case.’172 As Roberts illustrates, the temptation to use the tool of 
definitional balancing is too great for judges seeking to adopt a limited interpretation 
168 R v Landry (1986) 25 CCC (3d) 1, 30 La Forest J.
169 Council of Europe (1956, pp 12–13, p 14, and p 16).
170 Ibid, 17–18. Amendment of 4th February 1950 presented by Sir Oscar Dowson. Council of Europe 
(1976, pp 186–188).
171 Creanga (n 79), [93].
172 Austin ECHR (n 30), [68].
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of the right to liberty.173 Crucially, in a context where the state is exercising coercive 
powers there can be no place for a de minimis principle. Thus, once there has been a 
deprivation of liberty the shortness of that deprivation will not affect that finding. In 
other words, once subject to a coercive power and thereby deprived of their liberty 
the fact that the stop and search will only last a few minutes will not affect the find-
ing of a prima facie infringement of Article 5 that needs to be justified.174
Once it is established that a stop and search power constitutes a deprivation of 
liberty it would then fall to be decided whether that interference could be upheld 
as an exception within the terms of the express exceptions set out in Article 5(1)175 
or now as part of a general public interest balance in line with the opinions in Aus-
tin.176 With respect to the latter the sorts of items, knives and other deadly weapons, 
that justify the use of section 60 CJPO pose a threat to life, and could therefore fall 
within the scope of Austin. However, at this juncture two important points must be 
made. First, the need to ensure a fair balance through a reconciliation of the state’s 
positive obligations to safeguard life under Article 2 and the right to liberty under 
Article 5 was developed without reference to long standing authority, which coun-
sels caution here.177 The European Court has yet to reconcile this jurisprudence in a 
coherent manner.178 And second, as argued above, Austin is a novel and dangerous 
departure from the accepted principles of Convention and constitutional interpreta-
tion, which ought not to be followed.
Be that as it may, with respect to the express limitations contained in Article 5, 
without doubt Article 5(1)(b) would be the most appropriate. Article 5(1)(b) justifies 
‘the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order 
of a court or in order to secure the fulfillment of any obligation prescribed by law.’179 
This will, of course, require an assessment of the proportionality of the impugned 
provision. Yet the approach of the English courts is once more open to question. For 
instance, in Beghal the majority were content to dismiss the application of Article 5 
on the basis that in the case before them there had been a justified interference with 
the right. However, as Lord Kerr observed in his dissent, the disproportionality of 
the interference was created by the power itself, rather than a specific exercise of it. 
Importantly, as was noted above, Lord Kerr reached this conclusion after applying 
173 Roberts HC (n 25), [41].
174 Brega v Moldova [2012] ECHR 61485/08. Here the applicant was bundled into a trolley bus by sev-
eral plain-clothes detectives in order to keep him from reaching a demonstration. The restraint lasted for 
eight minutes. The European Court held that this de facto detention amounted to a deprivation of liberty.
175 Engel (n 11), as the court noted at [57] ‘the list of deprivations of liberty set out therein is exhaustive, 
as is shown by the words "save in the following cases".’
176 Austin HL, (n 6), [34] Lord Hope. In Hicks SC (n 95) Lord Toulson considered the arrest of the 
appellants under both the Austin doctrine and Article 5(1)(c) approach before determining that their pre-
ventative detention was justified under the latter.
177 See Osman v United Kingdom [1998] ECHR 87/1997/871/1083, [116].
178 The European Court mentioned the duties under Articles 2 and 3 ECHR in passing during S, V and A 
v Denmark [2018] ECHR 35553/12, [124] but did not develop any coherent analysis of the tension.
179 Vasileva (n 92), [36] and [38]; Sarigiannis v Italy [2011] ECHR 14569/05, [42]–[44]; and the admis-
sibility decision in Novotka v Slovakia [2003] ECHR 47244/99.
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the proportionality test set down in Bank Mellat,180 in contrast to the majority who 
did not. But the lack of rigour at the limitation stage should not be a surprise. Where 
a court determines a Convention right ‘barely’ applies any subsequently proportion-
ality analysis will be less than rigorous, and any interference will be more readily 
upheld without exacting scrutiny. Similarly, the conclusion that an interference is 
necessary in a democratic society will be more easily met when the application of 
a right is weak. Unsurprisingly, the courts readily held that the challenges of mod-
ern policing provide a strong public interest justification for stop and search powers 
for example. Yet the need to protect lives and detect crime does not grant the state 
a carte blanche. Simply because a power is of alleged utility it does not automati-
cally become legal.181 In fact, there growing evidence that in this context the claim 
of necessity is overstated for there is growing evidence that stop and search powers 
fail to have the deterrent quality that it is often claimed that they enjoy182: Indeed, ‘it 
seems likely that stop and search has never been particularly effective in controlling 
crime.’183 The evidence shows that a surge in the use of section 60 had little impact 
on the underlying trend in non-domestic violence.184
Conclusion
It is a remarkable feature of current human rights jurisprudence that Article 5 fails 
to offer any effective control of coercive police powers. From Gillan through Austin 
to Roberts Article 5 has consistently been interpreted by the courts in a way that 
puts police powers beyond Convention control leaving only formal arrest and deten-
tion to fall within its provenance. In short, the jurisprudence has failed to keep pace 
with the expansion of police powers. Only the intervention of the European Court 
in Gillan and later Beghal has brought much relief, albeit under Article 8 ECHR. 
Without doubt this is a consequence of the nebulous test in Guzzardi. Yet as the 
European Court has indicted in several cases another factor is often in play in such 
cases, namely coercion. Indeed, the concept of coercion provides a more realistic 
and effective concept to control police powers under Article 5. Here the Canadian 
experience of employing coercion under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms pro-
vides valuable lessons for us. Of course, if we recognize that many powers short 
of arrest are inherently coercive and that their use involves a deprivation of liberty 
under Article 5 it will be necessary to subject them to proper scrutiny to determine 
if the deprivation is justified. But such analysis is necessary if we are to close the 
legal grey hole in the important area of police powers which has developed as a 
consequence.
180 Bank Mellat (n 84).
181 Beghal SC (n 57), [93] Lord Kerr dissenting.
182 Tiratelli (2018).
183 Ibid, p 1226.
184 Ibid, p 1215 and p 1225.
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